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Introduction  
There has been enormous growth in the use of biotechnology in food crop production. In
1999 approximately100 million acres were planted to genetically modified (GM) crops, four
times more than the area in 1997 (James 1998).  Despite this growing use, concerns have been
raised in both the popular press (e.g., Bonham 1999) and scientific articles (Butler et al. 1999)
regarding the potential for the widespread release of GM crops to result in environmental
damage.  In part, this view is fostered by concerns that GM crops are being released without
adequate knowledge of their long term environmental impacts (Mander and Goldsmith 1996;
Butler et al. 1999) or, in some countries, without procedures to deal with environmental
problems that may occur (Hruska and Lara Pavón 1997). Currently the decision to release a GM
crop within United States is based on an assessment of the risks of environmental, health and
other potential damages (Mooney and Klein In Press).  Although considerable research is being
undertaken to understand these risks, opinions differ regarding the probability of environmental
damage.
Potential environmental damages from GM crops could be localized, affecting individual
landowners or, widely dispersed, affecting the welfare of society as a whole. Markets for
environmental services are often incomplete or non-existent and as such the environmental
effects of biotechnology may not be effectively internalized in private decisions. A central issue
in the design of environmental policy is the choice of the appropriate instrument for internalizing
externalities (Baumol and Oates 1988; Shavell, 1984; Weitzman 1974). The efficient choice will
be a function of the nature of the potential external effects, and firm characteristics. In the US,
once a GM crop has passed the permitting, testing and tolerance requirements there are no1 Tort law concerns compensable wrongs that do not arise from breach of contract and
cannot be remedied by an injunction against future interference.  The economic purpose of tort
liability is to induce injurers to internalize externalities my making then compensate the victim
(Cooter and Ulen 19XX)..
2For example, the Columbia river has been dammed, diverted and salmon spawning
habitat destroyed.  These cummulative factors have led to the decline of salmon populations over
time.
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statutory remedies for public or private parties that are damaged by users or manufacturers of an
approved GM crop (Lewis 1997).  Instead, the US along with most other countries will rely on
the default mechanism of addressing grievances through tort
1 actions based on liability rules
(Lewis 1997).
Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) and Shavell (1986) indicate that tort liability may not deter
risky behavior when (1) there is a long latency period between the use of a technology and the
realization of the harm; and (2) total damages exceed the assets available to the defendant.
Recent experience with oil spills from the Exxon Valdez or cases of endangered species’ habitat
restoration have illustrated that environmental damages can be costly (or impossible) to mitigate
and may occur at a point in time later than the initial deleterious actions.
2 Ecosystem damage as a
result of releasing GM crops could be widespread, appear following a time delay and be similarly
costly.
In this paper we investigate the potential for using bonding mechanisms as an ex ante tool
to address the potential environmental impacts of GM crops instead of (or as a complement to) ex
post liability. Environmental bonds can encourage safety research within companies (Perrings
1989), guarantee a minimum level of compensatory or cleanup funds in cases where damage
occurs, and assist in allaying consumer fears surrounding the environmental impacts of GM3Modifications that provide other benefits are discussed in Marks, Freeze and
Kalaitzondonakes (In Press).
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crops. Two avenues of enquiry are investigated.  Firstly, does the environmental release of
biotech crops lend itself to regulation through a structure such as a bond? Secondly, are bonds a
more efficient instrument than tort liability in the case of environmental release of GM crops? Or
should bonds be thought of as a complement to liability rules? 
 We find that in the case of GM crops, a bonding mechanism is likely to be effective
under the same conditions as tort liability. The main advantages to bonding over a liability rule
are protection against bankruptcy risk, incentives to conduct up-front safety research and the
potential for products to be brought to the market sooner. The main disadvantages are that bonds
can be costly to administer and impose liquidity constraints for the firm.
Background
Environmental benefits and potential damages from GM crops
 Much of the concern surrounding the environmental release of biotech crops focuses on
their potential to provide environmental (ERS 1999), production and other benefits verses the
potential for environmental damage (several studies are summarized in Clark 1997, 1998, 1999
and Krimsky and Wrubel 1996). A common genetic modification to agricultural crops is the
addition of genes from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) to create resistance to certain insect pests or
gene modification to obtain tolerance to specific herbicides.
3  Crops with “built in” resistance to
insect pests can reduce the application of insecticides (ERS 1999) and potentially decrease
environmental externalities such as chemical residues and deaths of non-target organisms. 4Heap (1999a) reports 216 herbicide resistant weeds worldwide in 1998, of which 74
resistant weeds are present in the US and 24 in Canada (Heap 1999b).  
Page -4-
Herbicide tolerant crops enable producers to use herbicides more effectively, killing weeds with
fewer chemical applications (ERS 1999).  It is anticipated that genetic engineering can be used to
make crops resistant to major diseases and environmental stresses that traditionally have caused
large losses, thereby not only stabilizing yields but also reducing the use of fungicides and other
agents that inhibit the onset of diseases.  
 Environmental damages could result from the development of herbicide resistence in
weeds
4 as a consequence of using a single herbicide on herbicide resistant GM crops and insect
resistance to Bt. as a result of frequent exposure to Bt. crops (Tabashnik 1994).  Bt. is a naturally
occurring insecticide commonly used by organic farmers.  Insect resistance to Bt. could
significantly damage profits from organic farming and the success of integrated pest management
schemes.  In addition, it is possible that GM crops could outcross with weedy relatives,
transfering attributes such as herbicide and insect resistance to these species making them
difficult to control. Out-crossing could result in a number of undesirable consequences including
altered community structure, food chain composition and genetic and biologic diversity in
addition to the persistence of weeds on agricultural lands or adjacent wild habitat (Rissler and
Mellon 1996; Adam and Köhler 1996; Saat 1996). 
Previous investigations of environmental bonding
The idea of environmental bonds is related to early literature on materials use fees (Solow
1971; Mill 1972) and deposit-refund systems (Bohm and Russell 1985). In situations where there
is potential for environmental damage, an individual firm, manufacturer or third party posts aPage -5-
bond with a regulatory authority. When the firm demonstrates that there is no longer any
potential environmental harm the regulator releases the bond. In the case of mining, for example,
firms post bonds to ensure post-mining site reclamation. When the firm demonstrates that the site
has been reclaimed, the bond is released. 
Environmental bonds have been examined as a potential economic instrument to resolve
water quality problems from agriculture (Weersink and Livernois 1996); agricultural non-point
source pollution (Shogren, Herriges and Govindasamy 1993), reduce the generation of space
debris (Macauley 1992) as well as a wide variety of other situations (Carman 1997; Cornwell and
Costanza 1994). There has, however, been no investigation of the suitability of environmental
bonds to address potential harms of GM crops.
Precautionary principle, tort liability and environmental bonds
Under the precautionary principle, firms must demonstrate that their commodity meets
safety criterion (e.g., no offsite impacts) before they are allowed to market the product. In
contrast, tort liability and environmental bonding recognize that products may not be totally “risk
free” and instead provide deterrent effects and some means to partially or fully compensate any
resulting damages.
Liability and bonds are similar mechanisms in that each provides a financial incentive for
firms to mitigate potential external effects. Under tort liability, a damaged party can bring a suit
under common law to recover compensatory damages. The prospect of large damage settlements
provides an incentive for firms to ensure product safety.
However, the deterrent effect of tort liability is insufficient if the firm lacks enough assets
to cover damages. In effect, the firm’s assets are the upper bound on liability. In this case the firmPage -6-
is said to be “judgement-proof,” and ex post damage awards will not provide adequate deterrence
against the risky activity (Shavell 1986).
One solution to the judgement-proof problem is to require, up-front, collateral such as a
bond. The collateral bond is not necessarily an actual transfer of funds to be held by a regulator,
but rather is an obligation to pay in the event of some damage. This provides the agent with a
direct monetary incentive to improve product safety and/or comply with environmental
regulations. In both cases (i.e. tort liability and bonding) the deterrent effect is strongest when 
the costs of identifying and assigning blame for damages are low. Damages, such as pervasive
weediness, can be initially identified for low cost by visual inspection. Unlike tort liability, the
bond provides potential damaged parties with partial protection against default risk as if the agent
fails to perform, the bond is forfeited and used to remedy the performance failure. 
Perrings (1998) suggests several advantages for choosing to regulate using environmental
bonds. First, the bond would provide an upfront measure of value regarding the potential
environmental damages; second, it would provide incentives for firms to conduct additional
safety research before releasing their product; third, it would insure society against the
conjectured loses. Although the collateral bond reduces the firm’s moral hazard, it introduces a
moral hazard problem on the side of the regulator. A wealth-maximizing regulator, for instance,
may have the incentive to retain the bond whether or not reclamation is performed. If, however,
the operating permit specifies reclamation requirements that can be verified by a third-party at a
low cost, the firm should be able to successfully challenge the regulator’s decision. Moreover, a
state that establishes a reputation for such behavior would have future difficulty attracting capitalPage -7-
to its jurisdiction, and a surety provider would be unlikely to underwrite contracts held to be held
by that state.
Environmental Bonds for GM Crops
Conditions for successful environmental bonding
Shogren, Herriges and Govindasamy (1993) use examples from the coal mining industry
to identify conditions when bonds are likely to be effective.  These are: (1) well-known damage
valuations; (2) a high probability of detecting environmental damage; (3) few parties; (4) a fixed
time horizon; (5) a well-defined agreement (e.g., both parties have the same definition of 
environmental damage); (6) a low bond value (relative to company assets); and (7) no
irreversible effects. These conditions are discussed below in relation to the case of environmental
bonds for the release of GM crops.
Bond the manufacturer or individual producer?
One question to examine is which party should be required to post the bond:
manufacturers of GM crops (lifescience companies) or the individual producers growing GM
seed. Requiring individual producers to post environmental bonds will present liquidity
constraints, which are likely to be binding for firms with limited assets. In some instances, a third
party surety may agree to cover the amount of the bond reducing liquidity constraints. However
the producer would still be required to pay an annual premium (typically one to five percent of
the face value of the bond), and the bond is a liability that will adversely effect the producers’5For a discussion of liquidity constraints in coal mining see United States General
Accounting Office (1988).
6 In general, this creates a serious monitoring problem in the principal-agent relationship,
making suppliers responsible for the potentially negligent actions of their customers; in the case
of GM crops, however, the manufacturer has presumably made assurances that the product will
not be ecologically disruptive in virtually any form.
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credit.
5  Given this constraint,  life science companies are better candidates to post the bond as
they have “deeper pockets”. 
In addition, requiring a bond from manufacturers rather than individual producers is
advantageous as this reduces the number of agents posting a bond.
6 Commercialization of biotech
products has led to considerable industry consolidation (Marks, Freeze and Kalaitzondenakis
2000) resulting in a lifescience industry that is dominated by relatively few large players
worldwide.  This supports the enforcement of environmental bond agreements for the release of
GM crops and reduces monitoring, enforcement and transactions costs.
Other Industry characteristics
An application of environmental bonds to life science companies that wish to release GM
crops into the environment meets several of the criteria suggested by Shogren, Herriges and
Govindasamy (1993). These are identified below and followed by a discussion of industry
characteristics that could be problematic for an environmental bonding scheme.
Many of the adverse effects from the release of GM crops are likely to be observable.  For
example, pervasive weediness or build up of insecticide resistance within pests could be
identified initially through visual inspection and confirmed with further testing. Life science
companies have employed slightly different methods to impart traits such as herbicide tolerance7Perrings (1989) discusses sequentially determined bond values.
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and pest resistence into agricultural crops. Through genetic testing it would be possible for a
regulatory agency (or a landowner) to pinpoint which life science company product was the cause
of the harm. As such there is a high probability of detecting environmental damage and pairing
this with a specific GM crop manufacturer.
A bond with a fixed time horizon could be developed for regulating GM crops and would
have several benefits.  Firstly, the firm knows for what period of time their capital will be tied
up; secondly, it facilitates choosing a discount factor and lastly the time horizon makes it more
likely that a third party will post a bond. A fixed time horizon will also provide a finite period of
time during which to gather additional information on the environmental impacts of the crops.
When new GM crops are first released, both regulators, manufacturers and producers have the
least information regarding their environmental consequences.  The bond could be posted for a
period of time sufficient to allow additional testing and data collection over several seasons. If
their release is more or less risky than first anticipated the bond value could be adjusted
accordingly
7 (the decision could be made by an agreed to third-party contractor as a means to
mitigate potential moral hazard on the side of the regulator).  Data analysis and collection during
this period could indicate whether additional bonds should be required in subsequent periods.
The requirement that both parties should have a clear agreement could be determined by
inventorying possible future states of nature and listing these as conditions of the bond.  Some
potential environmental problems associated with GM crops e.g. outcrossing with wild and
weedy relatives, could be irreversible if left unchecked. However monitoring and testing duringPage -10-
the period of the bond could identify these problems early increasing the probability of successful
clean up.  
The most problematic conditions to fulfil for successful environmental bonding of GM
crops are the requirement of well known damages and low bond value relative to company assets.
To value the costs associated with environmental damage the potential sources of damage must
be identified. Scientific debate tends to point to similar possible adverse events. It would be
possible to value each of these states of nature (although it is possible that no account has been
made for some other unexpected event) however estimating a probability associated with their
occurrence could be problematic. 
In the case of a bond posted for mine clean up activities, the geographic extent of these
activities tends to be known and related to a single site.  The environmental release of biotech
crops differs from this in several ways.  First the same products will be released at many different
sites all with slightly different environmental conditions and thus the geographic extent of
damage could be very wide or localized depending on local conditions. Further there is the
question of international environmental damage.  Biotech crops produced by a single company
are grown in several countries. Damage disbursed on a wide geographical scale could make the
value of the bond very large indeed. 
Problems of potentially large environmental damages, and uncertainty regarding the
magnitude and nature of environmental damages are impediments that must be overcome for the
successful design and implementation of environmental bonds.  However, on the whole it
appears that environmental bonding could be used as an instrument to regulate the release of GM
crops.8See Shavell (1984) for a discussion of the relative costs of private tort regulation versus
public safety regulation.
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Environmental bonding versus tort liability
An advantage of a liability rule over bonding is that if there is no harm, there are no
administrative costs of running the system.
8 All costs are incurred from the point in time that
environmental damage has been identified and not before.  In addition, given that environmental
damage from GM crops could be easy to identify this provides a strong incentive for companies
to engage in safety research. An environmental mishap would be likely to increase public
demands for stringent regulation of future GM product development and implementation,
bolstering the incentive for biotech firms to remediate any damages. In addition, the broad and
often negative publicity in the popular press regarding biotech innovations (Kalaitzondenakis and
Marks 1999; Marks and Mooney 2000) provides a powerful  incentive for the company to engage
in clean up. In contrast, there are a variety of costs associated with the bonding rule, prior to any
damages.  These include costs of calculating the expected damages, costs to the firm of securing
a third party to post annual premiums of bond, and the opportunity cost of capital held for the
bond. Under either instrument some study of the potential economic costs is required.  However
under a liability rule these are not incurred until damages take place while under a bonding
mechanism these will be paid for up front to determine the price of the bond.
Tort liability has limitations when there is a long latency period between an action and its
effects.  For example, the company may have gone out of business before damages are found.
Similarly environmental bonds are also limited in these situations but for different reasons. First,
there is the constraint of having capital tied up for long periods of time. Second, because ofPage -12-
uncertainty, surety providers are unlikely to underwrite bonds over time horizons where there is
considerable uncertainty. 
Perhaps the most significant advantages of environmental bonds are to redistribute the
burden of proof from plaintiff under liability rule to defendant and their liability to guarantee a
minimum amount of funds for clean up operations.  However this raises an interesting issue as
firms that would not be affected by liquidity constraints of posting a large bond are unlikely to be
significant default risks (e.g., Exxon did not go bankrupt as a result of its compensatory and
punitive damages after the Valdez spill). In other words, the bonding mechanism adds
administrative costs above the liability rule, without any reason to believe that the outcome is
different. 
Finally environmental bonding could provide an advantage over tort liability in terms of
the time period required to release a product on the market.  If a firm is willing to provide a
significant bond this can be taken a signal that the firm feels confident in the safety of its product
and should be allowed to market it.  Under a liability rule, the firm may have to wait a longer
period of time before releasing the product. 
Conclusions
In many respects liability rule and environmental bonds are complements, not substitutes.
Both instruments utilize the deterrent effect of financial penalties (court ordered compensatory
damages or bond forfeiture) as incentive mechanism, and both are likely to be effective under
similar conditions. The major differences are (1) the bond partially insures against a default risk;
and (2) the burden of proof is on the defendant rather than the plaintiff under a bondingPage -13-
mechanism. Neither the bond nor tort liability is likely to be effective if there are long latency
periods between cause and effect. Therefore, if this is a source of environmental change
associated with GM crops, some form of command and control regulation is likely to be a
superior option.  
Despite limitations of bonding mechanism, firms are likely to prefer posting a bond to the
constraints of the precautionary principle. With the precautionary principle, the firm must in
effect go to court and prove its innocence before it can introduce its product. With a bond in
place, the firm can market its product and there must be some evidence of environmental harm
before firm has to incur heightened standard of proof to recover its bond. Page -14-
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